Abstract. In this paper, we show that the FFT-Hash function proposed by Schnorr 2] is not collision free. Finding a collision requires about 2 24 computation of the basic function of FFT. This can be done in few hours on a SUN4-workstation. In fact, it is at most as strong as a one-way hash function which returns a 48 bits length value. Thus, we can invert the proposed F F T hash-function with 2 48 basic computations. Some simple improvements of the FFT hash function are also proposed to try to get rid of the weaknesses of FFT.
FFT-Hash-II, Notations
The FFT-hash function is built on a basic function < : > which takes one 128-bits long hash block H and one 128-bits long message block M, and return a 128-bits long hash block < H; M >. The hash value of n message blocks M 1 ; : : :; M n is < : : : << H 0 ; M 1 >; M 2 >; : : :; M n > where H 0 is a constant given in hexadecimal by : H 0 = 0123 4567 89ab cdef fedc ba98 7654 3210
The basic function is de ned by two one-to-one functions Rec and FT2 on the set (GF p ) 16 
Basic Remarks
If we want to nd a collision to the hash function, we may look for a pair (x; x 0 ) of two 128-bits strings such that < H 0 ; x >=< H 0 ; x 0 >. In fact, we will look for x and x 0 such that D( If we get a set of 3:2 24 strings x such that C(x) 11; 15] is a particular string R chosen arbitrarily 2 , we will have a collision on D(x) 8; 10] with probability 99% thanks to the birthday paradox. We will describe an algorithm which gives some x with the de nitively chosen R for any x 5; 7] = abc.
Given abc = We can de ne a function R and three vectors U e , U o , U 0 e such that :
(2) () 9 ; 0 ; y = R (abc) + U e + 0 U 0 e + U o (see section 3.2).
Finally, the system : x 5; 7] = abc C(x) 11; 15] = R is equivalent to the system : 8 < : Is we substitute y by the expression of the rst equation in the other equations, we obtain a system of three equations of three unknown , 0 , . This system can be shown linear in and 0 by a good choice of U e , U o and U 0 e . Then, this system can have some solutions only if the determinant, which is a degree 2 polynomial in is 0. This can gives some . Then, the number of ( ; 0 ) is almost always unique. For more details, see section 3.3.
Finally, this gives 0 or 2 solutions x, with an average number of 1 for a given abc. If we try 1 a < p, 1 b 768 and c = 2, we have 3:2 24 abc. 2 For the collisions found in this paper, R is the image of my phone number by F T 2. If we hope that no y i (i = 11; 12; 13; 14) is equal to 0 (we may ultimately test this condition, and forget the solutions y which do not pass this test, but this will be very rare), the system : This is a linear system of unknown and 0 . If this system has an equation, which determinant has to be 0.
Discussion
This condition may be su cient in most of the cases. The determinant should be a degree 3 polynomial. However, the coe cient of 3 is the determinant of the following matrix : The coe cient of 2 is 0 with probability 1=p, this is rare. In this case, we have one solution if the equation has a degree one, and zero or p solutions in the other cases.
has to satisfy a degree 2 equation. If the discriminant is di erent from 0, it has a square root with probability 50%. So, we have two di erent or no solution with probability 50%, and a single solution with probability 1=p.
For each , we are likely to have a uniq solution ( ; 0 ). However, it is possible to have 0 or p solutions, but it is rare. So, for each solution ( ; 0 ; ), we can compute y in the system (3), then x. Finally, we have zero or two solutions x in almost all cases. The function f R is a kind of reduction of FFT since a collision for f R gives a collision for FFT. We can use the birthday paradox with f R to get some collision. The expected complexity is O(2 24 ).
We can invert FFT with f R to. If we are looking for x such that D(x) 8; 15] = z, we can compute R = Rec ?1 (z) 11; 15] and look for abc such that f R (abc) = z 0; 2]. The complexity is 2 48 . Then, we get the x required.
Finding Collisions with the Birthday Paradox
If we suppose that f R is like a real random function, the probability that a set ff R (x i )g for k di erent x i have k elements is next to :
where n is the cardinality of the image of f R , when k is next to p n. So, with n = 2 48 and k = 3:2 24 , the probability is 1%. Two collisions have been found in 24 hours by a SUN4 workstation with k = 3:2 24 di erent x. With the choice : R = 5726 17fc b115 c5c0 a631 We got :
FFT(17b3 2755 4e52 b915 2218 1948 00a8 0002) = FFT(9c70 504e 834c b15c f404 94e2 02a7 0002) = 0851 393d 37c9 66e3 d809 d806 5e8c 05b8 and :
FFT(8ccc 23a4 086d fbb9 85f4 70b2 029e 0002) = FFT(9d53 45ae 3286 ada7 8c77 9877 02b4 0002) = 10e5 49f5 9df0 d91b 0450 afcc fba4 2063
Conclusion
The main weakness of FFT-Hash-II are described in section 2. First, the beginning of the computation depends on too few information of the input : B(x) 0; 7] is a function of x 5; 7]. Second, the output allows to compute too much information of the computations in FFT : D(x) 8; 15] allows to compute C(x) 11; 15]. The connection between B(x) and C(x) is linear, this makes our attack possible. To get rid of the rst weakness, we might mix H 0 and x in A(x) before applying Rec. Similarly, the result of < H 0 ; x > should be the set of D(x) 2i+1 instead of the right side.
